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Abstract
Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in
harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can
exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch
management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting
efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of
bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise
implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in
fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch
relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch
management programs.
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Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with
Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty
Rajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger, Iowa State University
ABSTRACT
Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in
harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the ﬁshing ground. These regulations
can exact signiﬁcant social costs in commercial ﬁsheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade
bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target ﬁsh species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and
harvesting eﬃciency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea ob-
servability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest
that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable
and trade in ﬁsh quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading
raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results oﬀer useful guidance for designing cap-and-
trade bycatch management programs.
Key words: Cap-and-trade bycatch management, costly bycatch avoidance, uncertainty.
JEL Code: Q2.
INTRODUCTION
National standard 9 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Management and Conservation Act re-
quires that US Fisheries Management Plans minimize, to the extent practicable, bycatch and
bycatch mortality. Examination of US ﬁsheries suggest, however, that signiﬁcant bycatch prob-
lems remain. A recent National Bycatch Report estimates that 1,887 marine mammals, 11,772
endangered sea turtles, and 7,769 sea birds were intercepted by ﬁshing gear in 2005, the base
year of the study (NMFS 2011). Unintended bycatch and discard of non-target ﬁsh species is
estimated at 1.22 billion pounds, or 17% of the total 2005 US catch. An approach often used by
resource managers to reduce bycatch of non-marketed, but socially valuable, marine species is
to curtail ﬁshing or regulate ﬁshing practices. Alternatives that allow the beneﬁts from commer-
cial and recreational ﬁshing to continue, while controlling unintended bycatch, are clearly pre-
ferred.
This article studies the implications of controlling non-marketed bycatch with a system of
tradeable bycatch permits. Under such a cap-and-trade bycatch regulation, the ﬁshery manager
issues a ﬁxed number of permits, each of which grants its owner the right to intercept a unit of
Rajesh Singh is an associate professor and Quinn Weninger is an associate professor, Department of Economics, Iowa
State University, Ames IA 50011-1040 USA (e-mail: rsingh@iastate.edu and weninger@iastate.edu, respectively).
We thank the Environmental Defense Fund for ﬁnancial support. We also thank Pamela Baker, Peter Emerson, Martin
Smith, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors alone are responsible for any
remaining errors.
Received February 10, 2014; Accepted August 13, 2014; Published online November 17, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086
/679461
Marine Resource Economics, volume 30, number 1. © 2014 by MRE Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
0738-1360/2015/3001-000X$10.00.
the bycatch stock. Permit prices provide incentives for ﬁshermen to avoid bycatch. Providing
incentives to avoid bycatch oﬀers an alternative to command-and-control regulations, which seek
to reduce bycatch directly through costly spatial, temporal, and depth ﬁshing closures; reductions
in ﬁshing eﬀort; lowering of target stock harvest; and/or gear restrictions.
Our model features two key elements of the bycatch problem. First, ﬁshermen employ a
technology that yields conditionally uncertain harvest of the target and bycatch species. Ran-
domness arises from unobserved absolute and relative abundance of the target and bycatch
stocks in the sea. Second, we assume ﬁshermen can exert partial control over the mix of target
and bycatch species encountered by their gear; bycatch avoidance is a choice variable in our
model. A weak output disposable harvest technology is proposed under which reductions in
bycatch involve reductions in the harvest of the saleable target species. The model thus allows
us to investigate the endogenous bycatch-to-target harvesting decisions that arise in equilibrium
under a quota-based regulation. While these features have been introduced separately in earlier
literature, combining both into a single framework builds new insights for the design of quota-
based bycatch management programs.
We derive and compare equilibrium harvests, landings, discards of the target and bycatch
species, permit prices, and input costs under varying program designs including a scenario where
at-sea harvesting operations are fully observed by the ﬁshery manager, and another where at-sea
actions are unobserved. The latter case describes most ﬁsheries in the US and worldwide due to
the high cost of placing observers on ﬁshing vessels. While observability is a must for imple-
menting bycatch cap-and-trade, our analysis of the unobservable bycatch case provides a baseline
for comparison with non-quota-based management instruments, such as eﬀort reductions, area
or seasonal closures, and gear modiﬁcations, which can be implementable without observers.
We also examine the implications of permit trading restrictions, which may arise due to
transactions costs; e.g., thin bycatch cap markets or regulatory prohibition. We show that
management performance generally deteriorates in the absence of trade. Without permit
trade, the cost of landing a given quantity of the target stock is higher, although bycatch may
fall below the target set by the manager. The intuition for the lower bycatch result is the
following. In the absence of post-harvest quota trade, any harvest overage of the target ﬁsh
stock must be discarded, while harvest uncertainty causes some ﬁshermen to land less than
their quota. In the aggregate, there is a larger input employment to land the same amount of
ﬁsh. Costs rise and proﬁtability declines. The larger input allocation provides added maneu-
vering slack to further reduce bycatch. A reduction in bycatch in the no trade case, by no
means, should be interpreted as an argument against trade. Trade allows aggregate target
quota and bycatch caps to be met. Therefore, if these targets are optimally chosen, the
equilibrium outcome under trade in quotas and bycatch permits is more eﬃcient.
As one would expect, our model also predicts that an observer program, which can monitor
and enforce bycatch caps at sea, commands ﬁshermen to employ inputs capable of harvesting
their target-stock quota while meeting bycatch limits. Placing observers on boats has its own
costs. As a result, while bycatch can be brought down to the desired level, harvesting costs will
rise. An observer program to cap bycatch at a socially optimal level has to thus balance bycatch
reduction beneﬁts with its increased monitoring costs.
Cap-and-trade management is an alternative to non-quota-based regulations that attempt
to reduce bycatch through: (1) reductions in ﬁshing eﬀort and/or target stock harvest; (2) clo-
sure policies that limit access to the target stock at chosen times, depths, or in regions of the
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ﬁshing ground where the bycatch stock is believed to be concentrated; and (3) ﬁshing gear
modiﬁcation. These regulations are popular in ﬁsheries, possibly due to relatively low admin-
istrative costs of implementation, for example, by avoiding costly onboard observers. Empiri-
cal evidence of the eﬀects and costs of non-quota-based regulations in the Gulf of Mexico
longline reef ﬁsh ﬁshery, which we provide as motivation for our study, suggests signiﬁcant
social costs in terms of forgone harvest and ﬁshing proﬁts. While data limitations do not
permit an exhaustive cost-beneﬁt analysis of competing bycatch management approaches, the
evidence we provide suggests that quota-based bycatch management warrants serious consid-
eration by managers.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy reviews the
market-based bycatch management literature. We then present an abbreviated case study of
the Gulf of Mexico longline reef ﬁsh ﬁshery to highlight the costs of non-quota-based regula-
tions and motivate need for alternative (quota-based) bycatch management approaches. We
introduce our model and derive our results. Conclusions and closing comments appear in the
ﬁnal section of the article. A supplemental online Appendix contains proofs of key deriva-
tions, empirical examples, analysis under alternate model assumptions, and other ancillary
empirical results.
RELATED LITERATURE
Eﬀorts to reduce bycatch and discards of ﬁsh, birds, and sea mammals have spawned a large
literature in the ﬁsheries sciences and economics.1 Bycatch management policy has generally
followed two somewhat independent paths. One focuses on modifying ﬁshing gear to improve
gear selectivity; i.e., designing gear to lower the quantity of bycatch intercepted per unit of
harvested target stock. Examples include turtle excluder devices on shrimp trawl nets and
circle hooks (as opposed to traditional J-hooks), which tend to snag fewer sea turtles and
cause less damage when turtles are hooked. Gilman et. al. (2006) summarizes the state of
knowledge regarding sea turtle avoidance technologies. A second path, one followed herein,
seeks to design regulations that provide ﬁshermen with incentives to undertake costly bycatch
avoidance.
Fishermen make many production decisions that can inﬂuence the mix of species intercepted
by their gear; e.g., choice of ﬁshing time, ﬁshing depth and location, gear and bait combina-
tions, net mesh sizes, duration of soak times for baited hooks, and use of sonar equipment,
which can increase awareness of species vulnerable to capture (see Branch and Hilborn (2008)
for empirical evidence). Bycatch avoidance is privately costly, and, therefore, providing incen-
tives to incur avoidance costs can be an eﬀective management tool (Bisack and Sutinen (2006),
Segerson (2011), Mukherjee and Segerson (2011), and Pascoe et al., (2010)). Economic incen-
tives for bycatch avoidance in cap-and-trade management programs, as we show, depend cru-
cially on ﬁsh quota and bycatch permit prices. A key novelty of our approach is that we in-
vestigate an explicit harvest-bycatch technology that, within an equilibrium framework, allows
us to study the properties of endogenously determined ﬁsh quota and harvest bycatch permit
1. We do not attempt a full review of this literature. In addition to Gilman et al. (2006), see Lewison and Crowder (2004),
Pascoe et al. (2010), and references therein. Economists (e.g., Arnason (1994), Boyce (1996), Turner (1995, 1997), and more
recently Singh and Weninger (2009)) have examined economic trade-oﬀs implicit in multiple-species quota management
programs and the associated bycatch problem. See Hutton et al. (2010) for a review.
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prices and their role in shaping ﬁshermen’s harvesting and bycatch avoidance behavior. As a
result, our framework enables a quantitative evaluation of the ecological and economic outcomes
expected under a target/bycacth species quota/cap regulation.
Our article most closely relates to recent work by Segerson (2011) and Holland (2010).2
Segerson (2011) presents a model of costly bycatch avoidance to study social eﬃciency under
various bycatch management policies, including taxes on the harvest of target and bycatch
stocks, limits on allocated eﬀort, and penalties or ﬁnes levied when a bycatch limit is exceeded.
In her model, the harvest of the target stock is deterministic, and bycatch encounters are ran-
dom. Segerson (2011) ﬁnds that taxes, ﬁnes, and caps placed on the bycatch stock at the in-
dividual ﬁsherman level can lead to socially eﬃcient bycatch avoidance, whereas similar mea-
sures imposed on target stock generally do not achieve eﬃcient outcomes. To induce eﬃcient
bycatch avoidance, Segerson (2011) suggests an industry-wide bycatch quota with a propor-
tional penalty/reward that is paid by/to all members when the group limit exceeds/falls below
the management target. Segerson (2011) does not evaluate a cap-and-trade bycatch policy at
the industry level and does not consider the implications of unobservable bycatch. Our work
contributes to the bycatch literature in these two respects.
Holland (2010) studies the impacts of individual bycatch quotas in a model of ﬁshing un-
certainty, with a focus on the role of risk aversion in bycatch avoidance behaviors. Holland
(2010) simulates bycatch, quota prices, and ﬁshing proﬁt distributions numerically under
competing assumptions for risk preferences, randomness in production, and quota pooling
arrangements adopted by ﬁshermen. Holland (2010) argues that quota pooling arrangements
used in the British Columbia groundﬁsh trawl ﬁshery reduce risk exposure and ineﬃciencies
that would otherwise arise due to thin quota markets. Holland (2010) assumes for simplicity
that bycatch encounters are purely random, acknowledging however that in reality ﬁshermen
aﬀect bycatch by changing when, where and how they ﬁsh, and the gear they use.3 Our model
extends the work of Holland (2010) by incorporating endogenous bycatch avoidance in a
quota/permit market equilibrium framework.
Quota-based bycatch policies have received increasing attention from managers and re-
searchers and warrant further analysis (Fisheries Leadership and Sustainability Forum 2009,
Abbott and Wilen 2009, and Holland 2010). Our contribution to the bycatch literature is
manifold. We focus on the role of markets in implementing aggregate target species and
bycatch limits in a setting of production uncertainty and endogenous bycatch avoidance.
Importantly, we study equilibrium outcomes including factor input allocation, harvest, avoid-
ance eﬀorts of ﬁshermen, and bycatch outcomes under target/bycatch quota-management.
Finally, since unobservability is a fact of life in most ﬁsheries and quota/permit tradeability
is often limited by market thinness or through regulatory restriction, we contrast equilibrium
outcomes under these two phenomena. Last, our comparisons with non-quota-based regula-
2. Earlier work by Boyce (1996) develops a stylized model of the ﬁsheries bycatch problem to address issues related to the
allocation of a ﬁxed bycatch allowance across multiple users and conditions under which individual transferable bycatch
quotas can replicate socially optimal outcomes. In the Boyce (1996) model, the quantity of bycatch intercepted by ﬁshermen is
given exogenously as a ﬁxed (perhaps increasing) proportion of harvest; endogenous bycatch avoidance is not considered.
3. A few studies have attempted to measure the cost of sea turtle bycatch management regulations. Curtis and Hicks (2000)
estimate the cost of closing portions of Hawaii’s pelagic longline ﬁshing ground. Chakravorty and Nemoto (2000), Huang and
Leung (2007), and Pradhan and Leung (2008) apply various empirical techniques to estimate the cost of reducing sea turtle
bycatch in the same ﬁshery.
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tions oﬀer crucial insight for regulators and industry faced, under the Magnuson-Stevens
Fisheries Management and Conservation Act, with the task of reducing bycatch.
BYCATCH MANAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
COMMERCIAL REEF FISH FISHERY
The Gulf of Mexico commercial reef ﬁsh ﬁshery is a complex of mid-column and bottom-
dwelling species consisting of snappers, groupers, tileﬁsh, amberjacks, triggerﬁshes, grunts, por-
gies, and a host of others. Fishermen also harvest coastal pelagic species such as mackerel, dol-
phin, shark and tuna. Total ﬁshery landings ranged between 13.053–16.645 million pounds
annually, between 2005–09. Annual dockside revenue varied between $36.884–$43.227 million
during the same period.4
Two main gear types are employed in the commercial reef ﬁsh ﬁshery. Vertical line gear is
the most common, followed by longline gear (ﬁsh traps, nets, and trolling gear are also used).
Longline ﬁshing involves deploying a long cable with as many as 2,000 smaller ganion lines,
each containing a baited hook, to the desired ﬁshing depth. The gear is soaked from anywhere
between 2–10 hours. It is then retrieved with a hydraulic winch. Captured reef ﬁsh are removed
from the hooks, eviscerated, and placed on ice for transport back to port.5
Loggerhead (Caretta caretta) is the main turtle species intercepted by longline ﬁshermen,
although gear interactions with Kemp’s Ridleys (Lepidochelys kempii) and leatherback turtles
(Dermochelys coriacea) may also occur. Turtles can become entangled in the longline ganion
or hooked as they pursue the same feed used as reef ﬁsh bait. Entangled turtles may drown
or be seriously injured and die. Turtle encounters with vertical line gear are virtually non-
existent due to the very short soak time; once a boat is on ﬁsh, baited hooks can be lowered
and retrieved quickly with little opportunity to attract and entangle turtles.
An onboard observer study conducted by the National Marine Fisheries Service from July
2006–2008 recorded turtle encounters on 17.6% of longline trips, and on 1.9% of sampled
sets (see NMFS 2009). Extrapolation to total longline eﬀort allocated during the study period
predicts that there were 861 sea turtle encounters (95% conﬁdence interval at 384–1,934)
during the 20-month period. The estimated turtle take exceeds permissible levels under the
US Endangered Species Act, requiring the NMFS to take regulatory action.6
In May 2008, the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council enacted three emergency
measures to reduce sea turtle bycatch. Longline ﬁshermen were prohibited from setting gear
shoreward of a line approximating the 35 fathom contour eastward of the 85 degree, 30-minute
longitude, across most of the Florida Gulf Coast. Second, longline ﬁshermen were permitted to
carry no more than 1,000 hooks onboard their vessel, of which 750 could be rigged for ﬁshing.
Hook limits are intended to limit the length of the longline, which eﬀectively reduces soak
time, a factor thought to be positively related to sea turtle encounters and mortality. Lastly,
4. In 2010, commercial ﬁshing in the Gulf of Mexico was impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster, which led
to spatial closures and signiﬁcant disruptions to commercial ﬁshing activity. We do not report data for 2010 as it likely does
not reﬂect normal ﬁshing activity. Our data do not include a complete record on 2011 ﬁshing activity. All dollar values are
reported in 2011 dollars.
5. Fishing with vertical line gear involves lowering multiple baited hooks on vertical main lines oﬀ the side of the vessel.
Turtle encounters are not considered a problem with vertical line gear.
6. Sea turtles are listed as endangered under the Endangered Species ACT (ESA). By law, the National Marine Fisheries
Service must adopt ﬁsheries regulations that are deemed not a threat to the existence of sea turtles. Encounters during legal
commercial ﬁshing activities at or below levels that satisfy this requirement are permissible under ESA law.
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managers limited the number of vessels that were permitted to use longline gear. Amendment
31 was passed in May 26, 2010, making made the emergency rules permanent.
Amendment 31 does not include provisions for onboard observers. The location of a
ﬁshing vessel is tracked electronically with satellite-based global positioning technology which
enforces depth restrictions at relatively low cost. Likewise, the number of hooks onboard and
vessel permits can be monitored at port, thus avoiding the need and expense of onboard
observers. Examination of logbook records collected by the National Marine Fisheries Service
suggests that Amendment 31 regulations have aﬀected ﬁshing practices and raised harvesting
costs in the Gulf of Mexico reef ﬁsh ﬁshery.
IMPLICATIONS AND COST OF AMENDMENT 31 REGULATIONS
Table 1 reports annual ﬁshing eﬀort, landings, and revenue for the Gulf longline ﬂeet during
the 2006–09 ﬁshing seasons. We report landings and revenues for all reef ﬁsh species com-
bined, and for the longline ﬂeet’s main target species, red grouper.7 Recall that longline bycatch
management regulations began in May 2008. The ﬁrst full year of the regulation was 2009.
Table 1 reports that 19 fewer vessels ﬁshed with longline gear in 2009 than in 2008. This
decline is more pronounced if we consider dedicated longline gear boats. If we measure par-
ticipants as vessels that used longline gear on the majority of their annual trips, the longline
ﬂeet size dropped from an average of 117 vessels in 2005–08, to 73 in 2009. Total longline gear
trips declined from 1,385 in 2008 to 793 in 2009, a 42% drop. Landings and revenues also
declined sharply in 2009. The decline is most pronounced for red grouper, where landings fell
39% and revenues fell 38% between the 2008 and 2009 ﬁshing seasons.
Logbook data provide evidence that reef ﬁsh ﬁshermen switched gear types in response to
Amendment 31 regulations. The number of vertical line ﬁshing trips increased by 749 in 2009,
a 10% increase over 2008. Landings by vertical line gear (all species) increased by 17%, and
vertical line landings of red grouper increased by 21% between 2008 and 2009. Total landings
for both gear types fell 4.4% to 13.306 million pounds, and total revenue declined by $4.53 mil-
lion, or 11.1%, in 2009.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for ﬁshing costs. Not all reef ﬁshing trips record cost
information, which is why the number of trip observations is smaller than in table 1.8
For longline gear, sample average cost per landed pound varies between $1.53-$1.83 in
2005–09. A small increase in the average cost per pound is indicated in 2009 when bycatch
regulations took hold. The average cost per landed pound on vertical line gear trips is higher,
with a range of $2.44-$2.68. Averaging across years, vertical line gear trips incur roughly $0.87
higher cost per landed pound than longline gear trips. If we compare median values, vertical
line gear costs are, on average, $0.70 more per landed pound.
Information on revenues and costs reported in table 2 suggest that regulations that reduce
longline gear ﬁshing in the Gulf reef ﬁsh ﬁshery are indeed costly. Reef ﬁsh ﬁshermen are able
to switch gear types, which oﬀsets the losses from reductions in longline ﬁshing. However, cost
comparisons across gear types suggest harvesting with vertical line is more costly. A few
simple calculations demonstrate.
7. The majority of longline ﬁshing takes place oﬀ the western Florida coast where red grouper is a prominent species.
8. Trip costs include: (1) expenses for fuel, bait, ice, and other miscellaneous expenses (from logbook data), (2) payments
to captain and crew labor, which we calculate as the estimated crew share times the trip revenue, and (3) ﬁxed operating
expenses. Details for crew share calculations and ﬁxed operating expenses are reported in the online Appendix.
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Total landed pounds by both gear types during 2005–2010 has remained fairly constant at
roughly 13.6 million pounds per year. The average share of landings on longline vessels be-
tween 2006–08 was 0.415. The longline gear landings share dropped to 0.242 in 2009. Assume
the longline share of reef ﬁsh landings would have remained at 0.415 in 2009 had longline
eﬀort restrictions not been imposed. Using the 2009 sample average cost per landed pound
from table 2, the ﬂeet aggregate costs would have been $1.70 million less. It should be noted
that the data-generating process underlying table 2 included depth restrictions and trip hook
limits. The $1.70 million cost saving can, therefore, be viewed as a lower bound.
THE MODEL
The harvest environment we have in mind is a single ﬁshing season in which the stock size
of the target and bycatch species are given. Due to random ﬂuctuations in the marine
environment; e.g., changing weather, water temperatures, currents, and the distribution of
feed, the relative mix of the target and bycatch species varies.
We assume the number of ﬁshermen is predetermined and large. To simplify our analysis,
we assume a continuum of ex ante identical ﬁshermen with a unit mass operate in the ﬁshery.9
The continuum assumption allows us to apply the law of large numbers, and scaling by unit
mass lets expected outcomes equal actual aggregate outcomes.
There are two stocks: a target species stock and a bycatch stock. For concreteness, the
target species will be ﬁsh and the bycatch will be sea turtles. Fish have consumptive use value
9. The assumption of ex ante homogenous ﬁshermen is not necessary for the key results derived in this article. Allowing
for heterogenous ﬁshermen will unnecessarily complicate the model and add few new insights. In an online Appendix, we
analyze the eﬀect of area closures with heterogenous ﬁshermen, where managers, as well as ﬁshermen, have perfect location-
speciﬁc knowledge of the stock mix. We show that our results are qualitatively invariant to whether agents are ex ante or ex
post heterogenous.
Table 2. Harvest Costs per Landed Pound (all reef ﬁsh species)
Longline Gear Vertical Line Gear
Trips Ave. Std. Med. Trips Ave. Std. Med.
2005 1,495 1.53 0.93 1.23 9,039 2.53 1.52 2.04
2006 1,409 1.74 0.97 1.47 8,570 2.63 1.55 2.14
2007 1,175 1.83 0.97 1.50 6,029 2.68 1.60 2.16
2008 1,209 1.66 1.02 1.33 6,086 2.51 1.51 2.03
2009 689 1.70 1.14 1.36 6,639 2.44 1.44 2.01
Table 1. Longline Gear Eﬀort, Landings, and Revenue, 2006–10
Eﬀort Landings (’000 lbs.) Revenue (’000 $)
Year Trips Vessels DAS All Spec. Red Grp. All Spec. Red Grp.
2005 2,028 170 12,908 7,508 3,085 $16,303 $8,974
2006 2,128 145 14,343 7,482 2,991 16,268 9,461
2007 1,362 134 12,068 4,968 1,938 13,835 6,456
2008 1,385 124 12,405 5,338 2,772 15,172 8,473
2009 793 105 7,690 3,214 1,084 8,713 3,242
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and fetch a positive unit price at the dock. Sea turtles have non-use value only. Harvesting
operations are conducted within a single production period.
Individual ﬁshing quotas grant their owners a right to harvest a speciﬁed quantity of the tar-
get species during a ﬁxed calendar period. Bycatch permits legalize turtle encounters. In our
model, the production period and ﬁshing season coincide.10
Measures can be taken to avoid bycatch, but these measures utilize resources. For example,
shorter soak times and ﬁshing at night, which has been shown to reduce sea turtle encounters
with longline ﬁshing likely requires additional labor. Sea turtle interceptions with longline
ﬁshing gear is aﬀected by the type of hooks used, the type of bait, the depth and location of
ﬁshing, the length of time baited hooks are soaked in the water, and day versus night ﬁshing
(Gilman et al. 2006). We model the cost of bycatch avoidance as reduced harvest and landings
of ﬁsh for a given input allocation.11 To be precise, we assume ﬁshermen choose a variable, c,
which determines the point along a target-bycatch transformation frontier at which produc-
tion takes place. In particular, reducing bycatch by a proportion c from its natural baseline
level reduces ﬁsh harvest by the proportion a(c). The avoidance-augmented technology is
expressed as:
fhf ; htg ¼ fzf ð1− aðcÞÞϕ1−β; ztð1− cÞð1− ϕÞ1−βgnβ: (1)
We assume an increasing and strictly convex product transformation between the target
and bycatch species. In our framework, the marginal foregone ﬁsh harvest that results from
a marginal reduction in bycatch increases with additional avoidance. Formally, we assume
a(0) = 0; a(1) ∈ (0, 1); a′, a′′ ≥ 0 with strict inequality for c > 0; and a′(0) = 0, a′(1) = ∞. Thus,
a(c) < c for all c. These assumptions ensure the proﬁt maximization problem is strictly concave
in c. We allow c ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, a suﬃciently high avoidance eﬀort eliminates bycatch com-
pletely, while still yielding a positive quantity of harvest.12
Figure 1 depicts the avoidance augmented technology. Maximum harvests of the target and
bycatch species for a common n is denoted A, B, and C in the ﬁgure for ϕ at a low, medium,
and high values. All three harvest outcomes correspond to the case where no eﬀort/input is
spent on bycatch avoidance; i.e., c = 0. If the ﬁsherman chooses maximum avoidance; i.e., c = 1,
bycatch is eliminated, but harvest of the target species is reduced to a fraction of its maximum
value.
Harvesting uncertainty is introduced as follows. We assume that when input n is chosen,
a ﬁsherman knows only the distribution of relative stock abundance, ϕ. Once at sea, actual
realization of ϕ occurs, as ﬁshing reveals stock conditions under the boat so to speak. Fisher-
men then choose avoidance c to intercept their preferred quantities of ﬁsh and bycatch.
10. An alternate interpretation of our model is that the ﬁshing season is divided into a ﬁnite number of production
periods. The analysis that follows would then apply to the ﬁnal period in which the target species quota and bycatch permits
bind, and aggregate quotas/permits denote remaining, unﬁshed quota/bycatch permits. Backward induction could then be used
to analyze avoidance behavior, quota prices, etc., in periods leading up to the ﬁnal period. A formal analysis of the multiple
production period case is not attempted here.
11. Segerson (2011) presents a model that is dual to ours; ﬁshermen choose a costly action that lowers the probability of
intercepting sea turtles. In her model, increased avoidance raises costs and reduces the quantity of ﬁsh that is harvested per
gear set.
12. The technology could alternatively be parameterized as null-joint in outputs, where zero bycatch is feasible only with
zero harvest of the target species.
104 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 30 NUMBER 1 2015
Our assumptions for uncertainty result in a choice problem that is solved in two stages. In
the ﬁrst stage, input bundle n is chosen based on the known distribution of ϕ. We call this
the planning stage. The second stage, operations, begins once ϕ and the harvest possibilities
are realized. It is clear from (1) that a higher ϕ rotates the ﬁsh-bycatch frontier clockwise (see
ﬁgure 1). In what follows, we let G(ϕ) and g(ϕ) denote the cumulative and probability distri-
bution functions of ϕ, respectively, with a support [(ϕ(min), ϕ(max)], with 0 ≤ ϕ(min) < ϕ(max) ≤
1, and xe ≡ E {x} ≡ ∫ x g (ϕ) dϕ denotes the expected value of a variable x. We use H(n, ϕ) =
{hf (n, ϕ), ht(n, ϕ)} to denote the harvest-bycatch possibilities frontier (HBPF). For a given
H(n, ϕ), input price, dockside ﬁsh price, and regulations limiting harvest and bycatch, ﬁsher-
men choose n in the planning stage to maximize expected proﬁts (denoted by πe) and c in
the operations stage to obtain their desired harvest/bycatch mix on the HBPF.
A few words about the model set up are warranted. Uncertainty in relative abundance
generates a stock-mix realization in which some lucky ﬁshermen realize a high target to by-
catch stock mix; unlucky ﬁshermen realize the opposite. This generates a natural environment
for trade in ﬁsh quotas and bycatch caps: the lucky ones will wish to buy more ﬁsh quotas,
while the unlucky will seek more turtle permits. Having a single parameter, ϕ, as opposed to
two separate stock uncertainty parameters simpliﬁes the analysis. Uncertainty is idiosyncratic
in our model. Uncertainty in the aggregate stock levels is important for setting ﬁshery-wide
targets and quantitative evaluation of alternative regulatory regimes; however, here our focus is
on bycatch avoidance behavior under quota- and non-quota based regulations. Aggregate un-
certainty in quota managed ﬁsheries is examined in Singh and Weninger (2012).
Alternate assumptions could be made regarding the timing of input choices and realization
of uncertainty. In an online Appendix we assume stock conditions ϕ are revealed before the
input bundle is chosen. This case is equivalent to assuming that inputs are perfectly reversible.
Our model assumes the planning stage input choice is irreversible. As an example, a ﬁsherman
organizes crew, bait, fuel, etc., based on expectation of stock conditions. The challenge is to
organize the committed input bundle to optimize trip revenue. While the full irreversibility
Figure 1. Relative Stock Abundance and Harvesting Technology
Note: The ﬁgure depicts the avoidance augmented technology under the assumption aðcÞ ¼ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−c2
p
2 ; ϕ
takes a low (ϕLOW), medium (ϕMED) and high (ϕHIGH) value.
Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management | 105
assumption may be somewhat extreme, it captures the essence of input choice under uncertain
production. Nonetheless, we take care throughout our analysis to indicate where results can
change when the irreversibility assumption is relaxed.
A second scenario models the production decision as a one-shot event in which n and c are
both chosen prior to the random harvest/bycatch realization (e.g., Segerson 2007). Our model
features endogenous bycatch avoidance combined with harvest uncertainty. A one-shot model
would require that we take a stand on the proportion of bycatch caused by pure randomness
versus the proportion caused by avoidance actions, and the results would depend on this choice
(Abbott 2007). Adding pure randomness to catch outcomes would require speciﬁcation of
penalties in the event of quota overages. This would introduce behavioral incentives diﬀerent
from those that arise from buying and selling quota in a decentralized quota- and bycatch-cap
ﬁshery. It is the latter incentives that are of interest in this article. For this reason, there is no
unintended bycatch in the operations stage of our model. In eﬀect, we assume that all bycatch
can be avoided at a suﬃciently high cost. This assumption may be reasonable for longline gear
where ﬁshermen have several options to avoid turtles (Gilman et al. 2006).
Finally, we assume the ﬁshery manager has accounted for the social costs/beneﬁts when set-
ting the target ﬁsh stock quota and quantity of turtle bycatch permits. In fact, these choices
depend on harvesting costs, which we show vary with the form of regulation. Determination
of the jointly socially optimal ﬁsh quota and turtle bycatch cap is reserved for future work.
CAP-AND-TRADE BYCATCH MANAGEMENT
We now consider the implications of our costly bycatch avoidance model in a ﬁshery that is
managed with individual quotas for the target ﬁsh stock and permits for turtle bycatch, denoted
in the model as qf and qt, respectively. Corresponding quota/cap prices are denoted by rf and rt.
We begin with a case where at-sea ﬁshing activity is unobserved by the manager. This scenario
approximates a regulation with no eﬀective controls on harvest of the bycatch stock and, thus,
no incentive to undertake costly bycatch avoidance. Analysis of the case where at-sea ﬁshing
activity is observable is discussed later. In each case, we contrast scenarios where quota is and is
not tradeable.
QUOTA-BASED MANAGEMENT WITHOUT AT-SEA OBSERVABILITY
Assume dockside landings are monitored but at-sea ﬁshing operations are unobserved by the
regulator. We assume the ﬁshermen’s objective is to maximize private ﬁshing proﬁts. Fisher-
men harvest no more than their quotas, even if it is feasible to do so. Furthermore, while sea
turtle bycatch is socially undesirable, and ﬁshermen will take necessary measures to avoid it,
minimizing bycatch remains a secondary objective.13 Thus if in the operations stage the
realized HBPF permits full utilization of quotas, we assume ﬁshermen choose a {hf , ht} pair
that obtains the lowest turtle bycatch. For example, suppose a ﬁsherman realizes the HBPF
depicted in ﬁgure 2. If his quota and bycatch cap is {qf , qt}, harvest will be at point A, and
both ﬁsh quota and turtle bycatch cap will be met. On the other hand, if his quota is {q′f ; qt}
13. Sea turtle bycatch management policies exist because sea turtles have non-consumptive social value. Fishermen’s non-
consumptive values have been ignored to simplify our analysis.
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at point B, he will harvest qf′ and ignore (and violate) his turtle bycatch cap by harvesting at
point C because the bycatch overage is unobservable.
FISH HARVEST AND BYCATCH UNDER TRADE IN QUOTAS
Suppose ﬁsh quotas are traded in fully functional quota markets. We focus on ﬁsh quotas that
have a positive price; i.e., rf > 0. This requires that all the quota supplied, qf , is bought and the
quota binds in equilibrium. Since quotas can be traded both before and after the HBPF is
realized, by invoking arbitrage we assume that the same price prevails in both sub-periods.
At the planning stage, a ﬁsherman anticipates his operations stage choices, contingent on
the realized random stock, to be rationally optimal. With this sequence in mind, we can solve
for the equilibrium ﬁsh harvests and turtle bycatch by applying backward induction.
The operations stage. Without at-sea observability of ﬁshermen’s actions, any cap on sea
turtle bycatch is meaningless. Eﬀectively, the price of turtle bycatch is zero, and a ﬁsherman’s
optimal choice will be to maximize revenues from ﬁsh harvest. Let the dockside price of ﬁsh
be pf. As long as the quota price satisﬁes rf < pf , a ﬁsherman will not incur any avoidance
costs and choose c = 0 to maximize ﬁsh harvest.14 This is shown as point D in ﬁgure 2.
Suppose ﬁsh quota bought by all ex-ante identical ﬁsherman is qf , as shown in ﬁgure 1.
Then a ﬁsherman with a realization of ϕMed simply harvests at point B with zf (ϕMed)
1−βnβ = qf ,
and does not enter the quota market. The ﬁsherman with ϕHigh, on the other hand, can harvest
more than his quota, and as rf < pf, will buy additional quota from a ﬁsherman with realization
such as ϕLow; e.g., at point A. The equilibrium quota price, rf , by arbitrage, equals its market
price at the planning stage.
The planning stage. At the planning stage, ﬁshermen choose inputs n, keeping in mind
their optimal operational responses to all possible realizations of ϕ. They know their harvest
14. With no aggregate uncertainty, rf ∈ (0, pf) holds. Under aggregate uncertainty ex ante and ex post quota prices will be
diﬀerent. Also, if ex post harvest turns out to be suﬃciently high, there may be an excess demand for quotas driving rf = pf. In
such cases, discard will also occur.
Figure 2. Harvest Choices for Diﬀerent Fish Quotas and Bycatch Caps
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will be a pair given by (1), i.e., the frontier points represented by A – B – C in ﬁgure 1. The
problem then is to choose n and qf to maximize expected proﬁt:
πe ¼ ðpf − rf ÞE½ϕ1−β⋅zf nβ −w n;
where w is the per-unit price of the input, and E is the expectations operator.15 An interior
choice of n solves:
βðpf − rf ÞE½ϕ1−β⋅zf nβ−1 ¼ w: (2)
Thus, inputs are employed to equate the value of their marginal product, left-hand side,
with their marginal factor cost, right-hand side. In equilibrium, rf is determined from the
above and the quota market clearing condition:
E½ϕ1−β⋅zf nβ ¼ qf : (3)
Notice that the assumption of unit mass, ex ante homogeneity, and i.i.d. realizations of ϕ
across ﬁshermen, equates the expected with the aggregate harvest, left-hand side. The ﬁrst
two assumptions also imply that the aggregate quota in the market equals that held by an
individual. To economize on notation, this feature will be repeatedly exploited in the rest of
the article.
By combining (2) and (3), the quota price can be expressed as:
rf ¼ pf 1 − wnβpf qf
 
:
The quota price can be interpreted as per-unit market earnings, net of its utilization costs. The
term wnβpf q f is the ratio of cost of inputs in its share of dockside market earnings. If ﬁshermen
are not quota constrained, this share equals unity and no rents accrue to the holder of quota
rights. If constrained, a lower constrained-optimal input employment implies that its share of
dockside earnings exceeds its costs, and the rents are positive.
Turtle bycatch. Bycatch is governed by ﬁshermen’s choices as dictated by (2) and (3). The
aggregate bycatch is:
het ¼
zt
zf
E½ð1− ϕÞ1−β
E½ϕ1−β
︸≡τ
qf ¼ τ qf : (4)
The higher the ﬁsh quota, the higher is the quantity of inputs employed, which leads to a
higher bycatch of turtles. Bycatch also depends on the mean relative abundance of ﬁsh in the
water. A higher average ϕ implies that the expectation term is lower. A higher average relative
abundance of ﬁsh naturally leads to a lower bycatch.
15. For completeness, the proﬁt function should be written as:
Π ¼ Eðpf ϕ1−β ⋅ zf nβ þ r′f ðqf − ϕ1−β ⋅ zf nβÞÞ − w n − rf qf ;
where rf and r′f denote quota prices in the pre- and post-harvest markets. This essentially yields the arbitrage condition rf = r′f
and allows proﬁt to be expressed as above.
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Thus, in a ﬁshery with unobservable bycatch and tradable ﬁsh quotas, sea turtle bycatch is
directly determined by the aggregate ﬁsh quota. In order to restrict sea turtle encounter/
mortality to a desired level, the manager has a single regulatory instrument available, qf. The
social cost of reducing bycatch mortality in this setting is the foregone net proﬁts from harvest-
ing the target stock.
FISH HARVEST AND BYCATCH WITHOUT TRADE IN QUOTAS
While ﬁshermen are assumed ex ante homogeneous, a rationale for trade exists as ﬁshermen’s
harvest possibilities diverge in the operations stage when stock conditions are realized. With-
out trade, however, a ﬁsherman cannot purchase additional quota to land any harvests that
exceed quotas purchased in the planning stage. We refer to ﬁgure 1 again for illustration. Let
the ﬁsh quota holding of all ﬁshermen be qf. Then, all ﬁshermen with harvest realizations ϕLow
will land their maximum possible harvest, whereas a ﬁsherman realizing ϕHigh will hold excess
quota; qf > zf ϕ
1−βnβ. These ﬁshermen are landings constrained. We next compute equilibrium
ﬁsh harvest and sea turtle bycatch when no quota trading occurs in the operations stage.
The operations stage. In the absence of operations-stage quota trades, ﬁsh harvest (and
landings) will follow:
hf ¼ zf ϕ
1−βnβ; if ϕ < ϕ ≡

qf
zf nβ
 1
1−β
qf ; if ϕ  ϕ
8><
>:
(5)
The planning stage. Given operations-stage harvests in (5), the problem at the planning
stage is to maximize expected proﬁt:
πe ¼ pf
Z ϕ
ϕmin
zf ϕ
1−βnβdGðϕÞ þ qf
Z ϕmax
ϕ
dGðϕÞ
" #
−wn:
The ﬁrst integrand represents harvests that fall below quota, while the second integrand cap-
tures stock realizations where landings are constrained by quota. The optimal input choice
equates the marginal input cost with its marginal value product:
β pf
Z ϕ
ϕmin
zf ϕ
1−βnβ−1dGðϕÞ ¼ w: (6)
Comparing necessary conditions (6) and (2) indicates two diﬀerences. First, the marginal
value of an incremental harvest under quota trade is pf – rf, since each unharvested unit can be
traded in the quota market at price rf, whereas marginal value is pf in the absence of quota
trade. Second, a marginal unit of harvest (at its maximum feasible) is useless if ϕ > ϕ, since
without quota trade the overage cannot be landed. Hence, the expectation under (6) is trun-
cated at ϕ
Expected ﬁsh harvest. With non-tradable quotas, aggregate ﬁsh harvest falls below the
aggregate quota since some quota is unutilized. Expected ﬁsh harvest follows from (5):
hef ¼ qf ð1−GðϕÞÞ þ
Z ϕ
ϕmin
zf ϕ
1−βnβdGðϕÞ < qf ; (7)
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where n is determined from (6). The ﬁrst term denotes the constrained harvest, qf, weighted
by the probability of being quota constrained. The second term accounts for all harvests that
fall below the quota, which also explains the last inequality.
Turtle bycatch. For relatively high ﬁsh abundance realizations, such that ϕ > ϕ, ﬁshermen
are quota constrained and harvest below the maximum feasible (e.g., in ﬁgure 2, points below
and left of D, such as C or A). In this case, the ex ante input allocation is ex post excessive in
the sense that the ﬁsh harvest capacity, zfϕ
1−βnβ exceeds the quota holding. Without opportu-
nity to acquire additional ﬁsh quota, the shadow price of unused input is eﬀectively zero.
Under our assumption of no unnecessary turtle bycatch, some turtle avoidance occurs. As ﬁsh
harvest equals qf, the choice of c at the operations stage is trivially determined from:
qf ¼ zf ð1− aðcÞÞϕ1−βnβ: (8)
Aggregate bycatch then follows as (see the online Appendix):
het ¼ ztnβ
Z ϕmax
ϕ
ð1− cðϕÞÞð1− ϕÞ1−βdGðϕÞ þ
Z ϕ
ϕmin
ð1− ϕÞ1−βdGðϕÞ
" #
; (9)
where c(ϕ) solves (8). The ﬁrst bracketed term denotes bycatch with avoidance: these are the
ﬁshermen who are quota constrained and can aﬀord to reduce bycatch. The second term
captures those unconstrained ﬁshermen who put all their inputs toward harvesting ﬁsh. In all
the numerical illustrations that follow, we assume aðcÞ ¼ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−c2
p
2 , which in the present case
implies cðϕÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 − ð 2qfzf ϕ1−βnβ − 1Þ
2
q
(see the online Appendix).
Recall that sea turtle bycatch under quota trade equals ztn
βE[(1 − ϕ)1−β]. Since c(ϕ) is pos-
itive, the term within square brackets in (9) is less than this amount. If, in addition, n here
is lower than its quantity under quota trade (see (2) and (3)), bycatch is lower. Otherwise,
whether bycatch is higher or lower with quota trading is ambiguous.
A normative comparison of bycatch under the two environments is complicated by the
fact that ﬁsh harvest is lower without quota trade. A meaningful comparison, therefore, re-
quires that aggregate ﬁsh harvest and landing be kept the same under the two trading en-
vironments. One can then examine whether trade leads to a lower or a higher turtle bycatch.
To land the same amount of ﬁsh with no quota trade, aggregate (and expected) harvest must
be higher, as some ﬁshermen harvest below their ﬁsh quota and divert inputs to reduce sea
turtle bycatch. Therefore, input employed must be larger. We conﬁrm this insight with a nu-
merical example.
Figure 3 reports the percentage increase in input cost and the percentage reduction in sea
turtle bycatch under no quota trade relative to their values under trade holding ﬁsh landings
constant across the two scenarios. As evident, bycatch is lower without trade in quotas. As
discussed earlier, when quotas cannot be traded, ﬁshermen employ a higher input quantity to
obtain the same expected ﬁsh landing. As evident, this raises input costs. Then, however,
ﬁshermen who encounter high ﬁsh abundance cannot direct all inputs to ﬁsh harvest, as this
would exceed their quota. Unutilized inputs are directed to bycatch avoidance, and bycatch is
lower.
As is also evident, the increase in input cost and decrease in bycatch diminish as landings
increase. The reason is simple. A higher landing target requires a higher quota allocation,
1 10 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 30 NUMBER 1 2015
which due to diminishing returns, implies a lower likelihood of a binding target-species quota
constraint. Trade becomes less relevant as the quota allocation moves towards its nonbinding
threshold, and the outcomes under two environments converge.
One key lesson drawn by comparing harvest and bycatch under trade vis-à-vis no trade is
that under the latter, eﬀort is expended to avoid bycatch, whereas under the former all eﬀort is
directed towards harvesting ﬁsh. Trade raises the shadow cost of bycatch avoidance. It is then
for the manager to evaluate whether cost increases justify bycatch reduction. Prima facie,
however, there may be a rationale for restricting trade when bycatch is unobservable.
It is instructive to examine the conditions under which this result will and will not hold.
First, as noted above, when the input allocation is higher under the no-trade case and irrevers-
ible, the opportunity cost of diverting unutilized n toward bycatch avoidance is zero. Bycatch
is lowered due to a good Samaritan eﬀect where, all else equal, ﬁshermen choose to avoid tur-
tles. If quota is tradable, the opportunity cost of diverting n to bycatch avoidance is positive,
determined as the productive value of the input in the harvest of ﬁsh that can be landed by
purchasing additional quota.
The assumption that the planning-stage input allocation is irreversible is crucial for this
result. If, alternatively, unutilized inputs can be costlessly saved for future ﬁshing endeavors,
maximization of ﬁshing proﬁts requires c = 0, and the harvest/bycatch ratio for a ﬁsherman is
increasing in the ϕ realization, as given by ð1ϕ − 1Þ1−β. In this case, sea turtle bycatch is unam-
biguously higher when quota cannot be traded relative to when it can be traded in the
operations stage. Without trade, all ﬁshermen harvest their ﬁsh quotas. With trade, high (low)
ϕ ﬁshermen buy (sell) ﬁsh quotas and harvest more (less) than qf. Since under trade a relatively
larger quantity of ﬁsh is harvested by high ϕ ﬁshermen who incur lower bycatch per unit of
target harvest, total bycatch is lower.
Figure 3. Cost Increase and Bycatch Reduction Under No Trade
Note: Results assume ϕ uniformly distributed on [0.7, 0.9] with w = pf = 1, zf = 0.1, β = 0.6 and qf = 1.
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QUOTA-BASED MANAGEMENT WITH AT-SEA OBSERVABILITY
We now turn to the case where sea turtle bycatch is monitored at sea. We assume the penalties
for violations are suﬃciently high and ﬁshermen, as a result, obey their bycatch cap by taking
all necessary avoidance measures.
If sea turtle caps are suﬃciently high, they do not bind in equilibrium. The choice problem,
as under the unobservable case studied above, is completely guided by ﬁsh harvests. On the
other hand, if the cap is suﬃciently low but ﬁsh quotas are suﬃciently high, the choice prob-
lem is governed primarily by the turtle bycatch cap. Fish harvest management then becomes
trivial. Therefore, we focus here on the more interesting case where both ﬁsh quotas and by-
catch caps bind in the aggregate.
As above, we alternately study scenarios where ﬁsh quotas and bycatch permits are and are
not traded in the operations stage.
FISH HARVEST AND BYCATCH UNDER TRADE IN QUOTAS
We continue to assume that arbitrage equalizes quota/cap prices across the planning and op-
erations stage since there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The operations stage. The ﬁsherman’s problem is to maximize proﬁts by balancing ﬁsh
harvest with turtle bycatch:
πðϕÞ ¼ max
c
ðpf−rf Þ zf ϕ1 − βð1−aðcÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
hf ðϕÞ
−rt ztð1− ϕÞ1−βð1− cÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
htðϕÞ
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
nβ − w nþ rf q f þ rtqt
8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
: (10)
With at-sea observability, bycatch must be matched with permit holdings which trade at
price rt. An optimal and interior choice of c, contingent on ϕ, is then:
a′ðcÞ ¼ rt
pf−rf
zt
zf
1
ϕ
− 1
 1−β
: (11)
Under our assumption ϕ ∈ (0, 1) the term within brackets is ﬁnite. Also, for positive har-
vests to take place, rf < pf. Finally, for all qt > 0, the equilibrium bycatch price rt < ∞. Thus, a′
(c) is ﬁnite, and it is positive when rt > 0.
Recall that a″ > 0, which implies that c is increasing in rt, rf, and decreasing in pf .
16 Thus,
the higher the bycatch permit price, the higher the bycatch avoidance. Conversely, the higher
the marginal revenue from ﬁsh harvest, the lower the bycatch avoidance. When rt > 0, we
have c > 0 for all ϕ < 1. Thus, no ﬁsherman harvests (or lands) his maximum feasible harvest
of ﬁsh.
16. For example, when aðcÞ ¼ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1− c2
p
2 , the above gets:
c˜ðϕÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
1 þ 4

rt zt
ðpf − rt Þzf

1 − ϕ
ϕ
1−β−2r :
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Figure 1 illustrates the optimum harvest and bycatch combinations at points A, B, and C
for ϕ realizations of ϕLow, ϕMed, and ϕHigh, respectively, when the quota held by all ﬁshermen is
at {qf, qt}. Equation (11) also indicates that c is decreasing in ϕ. Thus, a ﬁsherman who
encounters a relatively high concentration of ﬁsh directs little eﬀort to avoid sea turtles. The
opposite is the case for ﬁshermen who encounter a relatively high concentration of turtles. The
above logic also implies that ﬁshermen with relatively higher ﬁsh encounters will buy addi-
tional ﬁsh quotas and sell turtle bycatch permits, while those with lower ﬁsh encounters will
do the opposite.
The planning stage. We have assumed that all quotas are binding; i.e., no quota or by-
catch permit goes unutilized. As harvest and bycatch cannot exceed their respective limits, it
must be the case that:
hef ¼ qf ¼ nβzf Eϕ ϕ1−β½1− aðc˜ðϕÞÞ
n o
; (12a)
het ¼ qt ¼ nβztEϕ ð1− ϕÞ1−βð1− c˜ðϕÞÞ
n o
; (12b)
where c˜ð:Þ : ϕ→ð0; 1Þ is implicitly deﬁned by (11).
The optimal input choice is obtained by maximizing the expected proﬁt:
πe ¼ Eϕ ðpf − rf Þzf ϕ
1−β½1− aðc˜ðϕÞÞ
−rtztð1−ϕÞ1−βð1− c˜ðϕÞÞ
 	
⋅nβ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼ðpf −rf Þq f −rtqt
−w n;
which calls for an input quantity that satisﬁes:
wn ¼ β½ðpf − rf Þqf − rtqt : (13)
Input payments (left-hand side) equal their share (β) in revenues, as is standard with
Cobb-Douglas production functions.
It is worth reiterating that rf and rt are endogenously determined. Thus, equations (12a),
(12b), and (13) jointly determine n, rf, and rt.
Fish discards and turtle bycatch. As evident from (12a), there are no ﬁsh discards. Fur-
thermore, turtle bycatch in (12b) is exactly as planned by the manager. Those ﬁshermen who
exceed their individual bycatch cap trade from others; in aggregate, sea turtle bycatch exactly
matches the cap qt. This result is noteworthy. Recall that bycatch permit sales and purchases
determine its equilibrium price at the operations stage. These prices are known in advance (and
also prevail) at the planning stage because there is no aggregate uncertainty. These prices, in
turn, determine input employment, which in equilibrium has to be consistent with demand
(purchases) and supply (sales) of bycatch permits at the operations stage.
It is worth comparing the costs and beneﬁts with and without at-sea observability. We have
shown that trade in ﬁsh quotas ensures that ﬁsh landings exactly match their quota, whether
bycatch is observable or not. However, when bycatch is unobservable, its quantity is propor-
tional to the ﬁsh quota. The manager cannot set ﬁsh quotas and turtle caps independently,
whereas under observability this will be the case. From (12a) and (12b) we see that the quantity
of bycatch per unit of ﬁsh harvest will be greater when at-sea behavior is unobserved:
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het
hef
¼ Eϕfð1− ϕÞ
1−βð1− c˜ðϕÞÞg
Eϕfϕ1−β½1− aðc˜ðϕÞÞg
zt
zf
<
Eϕfð1− ϕÞ1−βg
Eϕfϕ1−βg
zt
zf
¼ τ;
where τ is as in (4). A lower observable bycatch requires ﬁshermen to incur avoidance costs,
and c˜ðϕÞ > 0 for all ϕ. The inequality follows from the assumption that a(c) < c for all c.
While an observer program can implement a particular bycatch quantity, the cost of landing
the same ﬁsh quantity without observability is larger by a factor ðEϕfϕ1−βg=Eϕfϕ1−β½1−aðc˜ÞðϕÞÞgÞ1β.
The cost of deputing observers on boats must factor into the policy choice. The bottom line
once again is that bycatch reduction comes at a cost.
FISH HARVEST AND BYCATCH WITHOUT TRADE IN
QUOTAS OR BYCATCH PERMITS
Now suppose that ﬁshermen cannot trade ﬁsh quota or bycatch permits and, due to ob-
servability, their harvest/bycatch cannot exceed their quotas/permits.
The operations stage. The quantity of input and location of ex-post HBPFs will depend on
the ﬁsh quota and bycatch cap {qf , qt} relative to prices. If the marginal return to the input is
high; i.e., {qf , qt} are suﬃciently small for given p/w, ﬁshermen will have chosen a relatively
large n in the planning stage. In this case, quotas and bycatch permits will likely lie in the
interior of realized HBPFs. Point A in ﬁgure with quota/permits {qf , qt} represents this case. On
the other hand, if quota/permit caps are suﬃciently large for given p/w, the HBPF may fall out-
side the envelope of zero-avoidance points. This allows for a quota/cap point like B with quota/
permits {q′f , q′t} in ﬁgure 4.
Below, we present the case where quota/permits are at point like A in ﬁgure 4. A detailed
analysis of equilibrium for points such as B is provided in an online Appendix.
As evident, if a ﬁsherman holding {qf , qt} in ﬁgure realizes ϕˆ, he precisely meets his targets
by harvesting at point A. If his realized ϕ is above, say at ϕ, he can meet his ﬁsh target and also
Figure 4. Observable Harvests and Bycatch Under No Quota Trade
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observe his bycatch cap by catching fewer turtles than qt. On the other hand, if his ϕ = _ϕ, he
can not fully utilize his ﬁsh quota, since doing so will violate his bycatch cap. He must sacriﬁce
ﬁsh harvest by diverting eﬀort to bycatch avoidance. This argument leads to the following
harvesting rules that implicitly determine a ﬁsherman’s avoidance eﬀorts, c:
hf ¼ zf ð1− aðcÞÞϕ1−βnβ ¼ qf for all ϕ  ϕˆ; (14a)
ht ¼ ztð1− cÞð1− ϕÞ1−βnβ ¼ qt for all ϕ  ϕˆ: (14b)
Thus, while (14a) determines c as a function of ϕ, n, and qf, (14b) determines c as a function
of ϕ, n, and qt. Let these functions be denoted as ĉf (ϕ, qf, n) and ĉt(ϕ, qt, n), respectively. This,
in turn, obtains:
ht ¼ hˆtðqf ; ϕ; nÞ≡ ztð1− cˆ f ðϕ; qf ; nÞÞð1−ϕÞ1−βnβ; ϕ  ϕˆ; (15a)
hf ¼ hˆf ðqt ; ϕ; nÞ≡ zf ð1− aðcˆ tðϕ; qt ; nÞÞÞϕ1−βnβ; ϕ  ϕˆ: (15b)
Thus, (14a)–(15b) completely characterize harvests and bycatches when {qf, qt} is suﬃciently
tight.
The planning stage. Using (15a) and (15b), the expected (and aggregate) ﬁsh harvest and
sea turtle bycatch are derived as:
hef ¼ qf ð1−GðϕˆÞÞ þ
Z ϕˆ
ϕmin
hˆf ðqt ; ϕ; nÞdGðϕÞ; (16a)
het ¼ qtGðϕˆÞ þ
Z ϕmax
ϕˆ
hˆtðqf ; ϕ; nÞdGðϕÞ: (16b)
Since quotas/caps cannot be traded, the optimal choice of input simply maximizes pf hef −wn,
where hef as expressed by (16a) internalizes the harvest/bycatch quota/cap constraints (see the
online Appendix):
w ¼ βpf
Z ϕˆ
ϕmin
zf ð1− aðcˆ tðϕ; qt ; nÞÞ− ð1− cˆ tðϕ; qt ; nÞÞa′ðcˆ tðϕ; qt ; nÞÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
<1
ϕ1−βnβ−1dGðϕÞ: (17)
It is instructive to compare the above with its counterpart under unobservable bycatch,
equation (6). Under both cases, landing is observable and ﬁshermen do not harvest more than
their ﬁsh quotas. Landing is quota-constrained when relative ﬁsh abundance exceeds a thresh-
old. Suppose the thresholds turn out to be identical under both cases. Then by (17) inputs
employed under observability must be less than those under no observability. This is intuitive:
a marginal unit of input not only increases harvest but also bycatch, and the latter is costly
under observability. This discourages input employment. Expected/aggregate harvest under
observability is lower as a result.
Recall that with unobservable at-sea behavior, equilibrium bycatch is lower with no trade
vis-à-vis trade, although the reduction comes at a higher cost. Does a similar contrast exist
when bycatch is observable? We examine this through a numerical example.
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Observable bycatch without quota trade. Without trade in quotas and bycatch caps, the
equilibrium is governed by (14a)–(17). We solve for the equilibrium and contrast costs and
bycatch for varying landings targets under the two environments. The results are reported in
ﬁgure 5.
Qualitatively, ﬁgure 5 is similar to that exhibited in ﬁgure 3, which reported outcomes with
no at-sea observability. Without trade, ﬁshermen employ higher input quantities to land the
same quantity of ﬁsh, which raises costs. With more inputs and a lower opportunity cost of al-
locating the inputs to avoidance under no trade, bycatch is smaller. As quotas/landings become
larger for given prices, the role of trade diminishes and the diﬀerences in outcomes diminishes.
It bears emphasis that under observability and quota/bycatch cap trade, any {qf, qt} cho-
sen by the manager is implementable. This is not possible in the absence of trade. The up-
shot here is that trade in quotas and caps welfare dominates the absence of trade, when by-
catch is observable.
Once again, the result that bycatch is relatively lower without quota trade hinges on the
assumption of input irreversibility. In an online Appendix, we show that with input reversibil-
ity, quota trade instead leads to a lower bycatch. The intuition is similar to the unobservability
case. With reversibility, c = 0 and a ﬁsherman’s bycatch/harvest ratio depends on ð1ϕ− 1Þ1−β .
With trade, a relatively higher harvest is reaped by ﬁshermen with high ϕ realizations by
purchasing additional quotas. Since these ﬁshermen inﬂict a lower sea turtle mortality, bycatch/
harvest in the aggregate is lower under trade.
CONCLUSION
This article develops a framework to study the design and performance of quota-based man-
agement approaches in ﬁsheries experiencing socially harmful bycatch of non-market species.
Figure 5. Cost Increase and Bycatch Reduction without Trade and at-sea Observability
Note: Results assume ϕ uniformly distributed on [0.7, 0.9] withw = pf = 1, zf = 2, zt = 0.1, β = 0.6, and qf = 1.
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Our model combines endogenous and costly bycatch avoidance and randomness in harvests of
both the target and bycatch stocks. We incorporate our technology within a standard optimiz-
ing framework to study ﬁshing behavior and management performance with observable and
unobservable at-sea ﬁshing activities, and with and without quota and bycatch permit trades.
Empirical evidence from the Gulf of Mexico longline reef ﬁsh ﬁshery is presented to motivate
our analysis and add context.
Our results suggest that, with trade in ﬁsh quotas and bycatch caps, but without at-sea ob-
servability, ﬁshermen do not incur the cost of avoiding bycatch while conducting target-stock
ﬁshing operations. Trading in bycatch permits is irrelevant. With trade in ﬁsh quotas, bycatch
can be controlled by the regulator only by reducing the ﬁsh quota and foregoing harvest of
target ﬁsh stock.
Bycatch observability introduces an incentive to undertake costly avoidance eﬀorts, through
the introduction of a bycatch permit user cost. A bycatch management scheme with both ob-
servability and frictionless quota/cap trading allows ﬁshermen to match aggregate harvests with
aggregate quota/cap for both the target and bycatch species, at lowest cost. Costs increase when
quota/cap is not freely traded. This is because ﬁshermen allocate more inputs to guard against
target-stock harvest underages, while at the same time revenue in the ﬁshery is lost without
trade, as some ﬁsh stock quota remains unﬁshed.
Overall, our results hold that eﬃcient target stock/bycatch outcomes emerge under quota/
cap management when regulators are able to observe at-sea ﬁshing activity and if trades of
target stock quota and bycatch permits are frictionless. Trading frictions can be overcome with
modern communications technology. Achieving at-sea observability at reasonable cost appears
possible with recent advances in electronic video monitoring technology. Our assessment of
the costs associated with non-quota-based regulation under Amendment 31 suggest tradable
bycatch caps should be given serious consideration in the Gulf of Mexico longline reef ﬁsh
ﬁshery and in other ﬁsheries facing similar bycatch problems.
The costs of non-quota-based bycatch regulations emerge as foregone harvests of valued
target stocks and/or higher harvesting costs. These costs can be substantial as evidence suggests
in the Gulf of Mexico longline reef ﬁsh ﬁshery. If sea turtle encounters are proportional to
longline ﬁshing eﬀort, licence reductions under Amendment 31 appear to address the goal of
reducing turtle bycatch. Assuming the 17.6% encounter rate is accurate and is unaﬀected by
changes in ﬁshing behavior, post Amendment 31, roughly 104 fewer turtle encounters occurred
in 2009 (see table 1). Data limitations do not allow an assessment of the cost of attaining the
same turtle bycatch reduction under a tradable bycatch cap program. While empirical evidence
suggests Amendment 31 regulations are costly in terms of foregone harvest and increased ﬁsh-
ing costs, an important advantage they oﬀer is that at-sea ﬁshing activity need not be moni-
tored. The cost of placing an observer onboard a longline reef ﬁsh vessel is estimated at $1,500
per day before administrative costs (Perruso 2012).17 Since quota-based bycatch management
would require 100% observer coverage, the price tag for a longline ﬂeet observer program
would exceed $1.86 million per year based on the 2008 days at sea.
Recent developments in electronic video monitoring technology, on the other hand, can
provide a viable alternative for implementing 100% observability (Lara-Lopez, Davis, and Stan-
17. L. Perruso (larry.perruso@noaa.gov), interview by Q. Weninger, September 2012.
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ley 2010). The cost of electronic equipment may be as low as $30 per vessel ﬁshing day. Ad-
ditional costs are incurred to review video footage collected by onboard cameras. These costs
could be kept in check through a system of ﬁsherman self-reporting and random auditing
(Stanley et al., 2011). That is, ﬁnes for misreporting bycatch coupled with random audits would
likely be suﬃcient to ensure eﬀective monitoring and thus implementation of a cap-and-trade
bycatch management program.
Comparing the costs of restricting bycatch below a particular target under quota- and non-
quota-based regulation can be diﬃcult. With suﬃcient data, a structural model of a target-
stock/sea turtle bycatch technology could provide a more complete picture of the cost of re-
ducing bycatch under alternate regulations. Extensions of our model to consider multiple ﬁsh
and bycatch species and/or multiple production periods could provide additional insights for
the design of cap-and-trade bycatch policies. Our article provides a useful starting point for fur-
ther investigation.
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